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This paper analyzes the relationship between bipolarization and inequality, welfare 
and poverty measures. First, we clarify the similarities and differences between 
bipolarization and inequality measures. Second, it is shown that bipolarization is the 
difference between the welfare levels of the richer and poorer income groups when 
feelings of identification between individuals are based on their utility functions. In 
fact, bipolarization is interpreted as the welfare of the richer group that is wasted to 
compensate for income bipolarization. Third, a relationship between bipolarization 
measurement and the normalized poverty deficit index is established. These findings 
are applied to the polarization measures of Wolfson (1994), Esteban and Ray (1994) 
and Lasso de la Vega and Urrutia (2006). 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between inequality, poverty and welfare measures has been the 
focus of a large body of research on distribution (see, for example, Lambert, 2001, and 
the references therein). However, relationships between these concepts and income 
polarization have hardly been analyzed. The similarities and differences between 
welfare, inequality and poverty measures are well known, but we know little about the 
meaning of income polarization in terms of welfare, poverty and inequality. In this 
paper, the measurement of bipolarization is linked to the other primary features of an 
income distribution.  
Polarization measures have recently been proposed as useful characterizations of 
income distributions.
1 It is argued that polarization measures represent a major 
departure from standard measures of inequality. This is because polarization 
concentrates the income distribution on several focal or polar modes, whereas inequality 
relates to the overall dispersion of the distribution. However, many empirical 
comparisons of inequality and polarization measures suggest that they are closely 
related. For example, Ravallion and Chen (1997) found a high degree of correspondence 
based on a comparative analysis of the Gini coefficient and the Wolfson bipolarization 
index. This, and similar findings, suggest that further analysis of the differences and 
similarities between polarization and inequality measures is warranted. In the first part 
of this paper, we address this issue in the context of the polarization indexes of Esteban 
and Ray (1994), Wolfson (1994) and Lasso de la Vega and Urrutia (2006).  
                                                 
1 See, among others, Esteban and Ray (1994), Wolfson (1994, 1997), Esteban et al. (1999), Wang and 
Tsui (2000), Gradín (2000, 2002), Zhang and Kanbur (2001), D’Ambrosio (2001), D’Ambrosio and 
Wolff (2001), Chakravarty and Majumder (2001), Rodríguez and Salas (2003), Duclos and Échevin 
(2004), Duclos et al. (2004), Prieto et al. (2004, 2005) and Lasso de la Vega and Urrutia (2006).   3 
Since measures of polarization do not fulfill the principle of progressive transfers, 
they are not directly compatible with standard welfare analysis. Thus, can polarization 
measures be interpreted in terms of welfare? Can the welfare of society be related to the 
degree of income polarization? Chakravarty and Majumder (2001) was seminal study 
investigating this issue for the Wolfson bipolarization index. In the second part of this 
paper, an alternative model is proposed in which bipolarization (measured by the 
Wolfson, 1994, the Esteban and Ray, 1994 or the Lasso de la Vega and Urrutia, 2006 
polarization indexes) is interpreted in terms of welfare. In particular, there is a 
relationship between bipolarization and welfare measures when envy between people is 
incorporated in the utility function. It is shown that bipolarization is the difference 
between the richer income group’s welfare and the poorer income group’s welfare when 
individuals’ utilities depend not only on their own income but also on their group 
incomes. Consequently, bipolarization increases when the welfare of the richer income 
group rises and/or when the welfare of the poorer income group falls.  
Nevertheless, a fundamental difference arises between the models for the Wolfson 
(1994), the Esteban and Ray (1994) and the Lasso de la Vega and Urrutia (2006) 
indexes. The Wolfson bipolarization measure requires two different sets of individual 
utility functions, one for each income group. However, the Esteban and Ray (1994) and 
the Lasso de la Vega and Urrutia (2006) measures require the same utility function for 
all individuals.  
In addition, it is shown that the overall welfare level of a society is the richer group’s 
welfare diminished by the level of income bipolarization. That is, bipolarization can be 
interpreted as the welfare of the richer income group that is sacrificed to compensate for 
bipolarization between poorer and richer groups.    4 
A striking feature of underdeveloped countries is the large proportion of poor people. 
For example, in 2004, at least 70 percent of people in Sierra Leone were poor (World 
Bank, 2005). Thus, in underdeveloped countries, it may be worth measuring income 
bipolarization between poor people and the rest of society. Policymakers in these 
countries should be aware of the social conflict (measured by the bipolarization index) 
due to poverty. Thus, instead of dividing the income distribution into two income 
groups based on median or mean incomes, it might be more appropriate to use the 
poverty line to measure income bipolarization. In the third part of this paper, we show 
that bipolarization and poverty measures are closely related when the income value used 
to separate income groups represents the poverty line. In that case, bipolarization 
between the poor and others in the income distribution explicitly considers the value of 
a poverty index known as the normalized poverty deficit index. In fact, the normalized 
poverty deficit index is equal to the Esteban and Ray (1994) polarization measure, 
whether the poverty line is the mean income and the identification sensitivity parameter 
is unity.  
The paper is organized as follows. Links between inequality and income 
bipolarization are clarified and extended in Section 2. In Section 3, the relationship 
between bipolarization and welfare is analyzed. Poverty and polarization measures are 
linked in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2  BIPOLARIZATION AND INEQUALITY 
First, we briefly describe three polarization measures that are used throughout this 
paper: the Wolfson (1994) bipolarization index, the Esteban and Ray (1994) 
polarization measure (ER) and the Lasso de la Vega and Urrutia (2006) polarization   5 
index (LU). Results on the relationship between bipolarization and inequality are then 
proposed. 
Let x = (x1, x2,…, xn)∈ ℜ
n
+ +  be an n-dimensional vector of positive incomes, in 
increasing order, such that  n x x x ≤ ≤ ≤ ... 2 1 , and let xi be the income of the ith person. 
We assume that n is even. Results for the Wolfson index are clearer when this condition 
is imposed. Nevertheless, differences with respect to the results for the Wolfson index 
when n is odd are negligible if n is large. Vector x is normalized to the value of mean 
income, µ. Median income is m.  
Wolfson’s index of bipolarization (Wolfson, 1994) was originally proposed for a 
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where G(x) is the Gini coefficient of the income distribution, and L(0.5) is the Lorenz 
curve at the median percentile. The larger the term in brackets, the fewer individuals or 
households there are with mid-level incomes and, hence, the greater is bipolarization. 
Note that, in our context, µ = 1. 
Wang and Tsui (2000) generalize a new class of indexes based on the Wolfson index 
by using the increased bipolarity axiom (that progressive income transfers within 
groups increase bipolarization) and the increased spread axiom (that regressive income 
transfers between groups increase bipolarization). However, we do not use this class of 
indexes for reasons that will become apparent.    6 
The Wolfson index of bipolarization has been reformulated in terms of the between-
groups Gini coefficient G
B(x) and the within-groups Gini coefficient G
W(x) as follows 
(see Rodríguez and Salas, 2003): 
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where the income groups are separated by the median income value. Therefore, 
bipolarization and inequality are explicitly represented within the same framework; 
subtraction and addition of the within-groups dispersion corresponds to bipolarization 
and inequality, respectively.  
ER assumes that each individual is subject to two forces: identification with 
members considered to belong to the same group, and alienation from those considered 
to belong to other groups.
2 Effective antagonism increases in identification and 
alienation in such a way that increased intra-group identification reinforces the effect of 
alienation. Polarization represents total effective antagonism. This broad starting point 
is combined with a set of four axioms. These axioms restrict the functional forms that 
can be incorporated into the general framework established in ER. The following 






ER x P µ µ π π π α
α − =∑∑ ) ; (                      (3)       
                                                 
2 Duclos et al. (2004) also propose a polarization measure that relies on the identification–alienation 
framework. This measure is not considered here because it deals with a completely different domain: 
continuous distributions.  
3 In the original measure incomes are in logarithms and a positive scalar, K, is specified for normalization. 
For clarity of exposition, and without loss of generality, we do not consider these minor changes. This 
note also applies to the Lasso de la Vega and Urrutia (2006) polarization index (see below).    7 
 
where  πi  and  µi are the percentage of population and the mean income value, 
respectively, of income group i. The alienation term is |µi - µj|, the identification term is 
α πi  and α  ∈[1,1.6] is a positive constant that represents the importance of group 
identification.  
This formulation is restricted to distributions that are prearranged in groups. 
However, datasets usually take a large number of values so observations have to be 
regrouped into a small number of groups before the measure is applied. This regrouping 
eliminates the dispersion within groups. Lasso de la Vega and Urrutia (2006) have 
recently proposed a generalization of the ER measure that incorporates inequality within 
groups and overcomes the shortcomings of previous extensions (see Esteban et al., 
1999). 




i i j i
LU G x P µ µ π π π β α
β α − − =∑∑ 1 ) , ; (                                                        (4)   
 
where β ≥ 0 is the degree of sensitivity towards group cohesion. The new identification 
term of each member of group i is  ( )
β α π i i G − 1 . Clearly, this measure reduces to the ER 
polarization index if β = 0.   




   8 
PROPOSITION 1: For the bipolarization case (N = 2), the LU polarization index becomes: 
 





β α β α π π β α − + − =                         (5) 
where  h  ∈  ℜ+ is the income value that separates the income distribution into two 
different income groups. Thus, as in the Wolfson bipolarization case, bipolarization 
according to the LU measure is a function of the between-groups Gini coefficient and 
the within-groups dispersion. 
 
Proof: If we consider two income groups separated by the h value: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 ) , ; ( µ µ π π π π β α
β α β α − − + − = G G x P
LU
h                (6) 
 






















.                   (7) 
 
L( 1 π ) is the value of the Lorenz curve evaluated at  1 π . If we take into consideration for 
two income groups that the vertical distance between the Lorenz curve value at π1, 
L(π1), and the 45-degree line, is equal to the between-groups Gini coefficient, that is: 
    
) ( ) ( 1 1 π π L x G
B
h − =                         ( 8 )  
 
and substituting (7) into (6), we obtain expression (5).   9 
This index is only a function of the income dispersion between groups for the 
bipolarization case if β = 0 (the ER case): 
 
( ) ) ( G   ) 0 , ; (
B
h 2 1 x x P
LU
h
α α π π α + =                      (9) 
 
Note that LU in this case is simply the between-groups Gini coefficient when α = 1. 
From (5), when h = m, the following expression is also derived:  
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Therefore, the relationship between the Wolfson and LU polarization measures when 
there are two income groups separated by the median income value and β = 0 is the 
following: 
 









W − = α
α .                 (11) 
   









W − =  when α = 1. 
 
Nevertheless, the ER and LU polarization indexes can be applied to any number of 
income groups. By contrast, the Wolfson polarization measure can only be applied to 
two income groups. 
In the next section, we use abbreviated welfare functions that incorporate the Gini 
coefficient to interpret bipolarization in terms of welfare.   10 
3  BIPOLARIZATION AND WELFARE 
An interesting relationship between bipolarization and welfare measurements arises 
when envy between people in the same income group is incorporated into their utility 
functions. 
We begin with the following general social welfare function: 
 
)) , ( ),..., , ( ( ) ( 1 1 x x U x x U W x v n n =                   ( 1 2 )  
 
where W is strictly increasing and Ui(xi, x) represents individual i’s preferences over her 
or his own income and the income distribution x. In principle, preferences are not 
individualistic. Let h ∈ ℜ+ be the income that separates the income distribution into 
two different groups: incomes below h and incomes above h. The first group have 
preferences according to the utility functional Uh(⋅,y), where y is the income distribution 
for people below h. The second group has preferences according to the utility function 
) , ( t Uh ⋅ , where t is the income distribution for people above h. People care about their 
own incomes and the income distribution of the group to which they belong. 
Consequently, v must be partially symmetric; that is, society should be indifferent to 
permutations among incomes of each group but not necessarily between groups (see 
Cowell, 1980). Moreover, it is assumed that W(·) is additively separable. We can 
decompose overall welfare into contributions from the two different income groups as 
follows:  
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+ = =                       (13)   11 
where W1 and W2 are the average welfare levels of each group. Therefore, π1W1 and 
π2W2 are the contributions of each group to overall welfare. We use this decomposition 
of social welfare to propose an interpretation of bipolarization in terms of welfare. First, 
however, we present two preliminary but necessary results.  
It is well known that the rankings induced by a symmetric, increasing and 
individualistic abbreviated welfare function, and by –G, on two income distributions 
with the same mean income are not necessarily the same (Newbery, 1970). 
Nevertheless, the use of an abbreviated welfare function containing the Gini coefficient 
can be justified when the welfare function is non-individualistic (see, for example, 
Sheshinski, 1972, and Kakwani, 1980 and 1986). 
Let D(xi;xj) be the relative deprivation felt by an individual with income xi in relation 
to an individual with income xj, as follows (see Runciman, 1966, Yitzhaki, 1979 and 
Hey and Lambert, 1980): 
 
i j j i x x x x D − = ) ; (  if  i x  ≤  j x     
0 ) ; ( = j i x x D               if  i x  ≥  j x .         (14)                          
 













) ( .   (15) 
 
Now, let U
D(xi,x) be the utility function of an individual with income xi, as follows: 
 
) ( ) , ( i i i
D x bD ax x x U − =       a, b > 0.   (16)   12 
The individual cares not only about his or her own income but also about the 
distribution to which he or she belongs. In particular, the higher the deprivation felt by 
the individual, the lower his or her utility. 
The following result justifies the use of an abbreviated welfare function that 
incorporates the Gini coefficient when W is non-individualistic. 
 
RESULT 1 (see Lambert, 2001, pp. 123-4).
4 Let  ) ( ) , ( i i i
D x bD ax x x U − =  be the utility 
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for every income distribution x. 
 
Subsequently, we use this result (for a = b = 1) to link overall bipolarization in 
society to welfare. 
A parallel result arises when the concept of relative satisfaction is introduced (see 
Yitzhaki, 1979 and Hey and Lambert, 1980). 
Let S(xi; xj) be the relative satisfaction felt by an individual with income xi in relation 
to an individual with income xj, as follows: 
 
j i j i x x x x S − = ) ; (  if  i x  ≥  j x     
0 ) ; ( = j i x x S               if  i x  ≤  j x .  (17)      
 
The satisfaction felt by an individual with income  i x  is: 
                                                 
4 A similar result,  [ ] )) ( 1 ( 5 . 0 ) ( x G b a x W x + − = µ , is obtained when the altruistic utility function, 






x U − =    a, b > 0, is used, in which the arguments are the individual’s own income 
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Now let U
S(xi, x) be the utility function of the individual with income xi, as follows: 
 
) ( ) , ( i i i
S x bS ax x x U + =     a, b > 0.   (19)  
     
In this case, envy is different: an individual with income xi is better off when more 
people have less income than does he or she. People care about status. Consequently, 
the greater the relative satisfaction felt by an individual with income xi, the higher his or 
her utility. 
The following result enables the use of an abbreviated welfare function 
(incorporating the Gini coefficient) when W is non-individualistic in a different way 
than in the context of Result 1. 
 
RESULT  2.
5 Let S(xi) be the relative satisfaction function and let 
) ( ) , ( i i i














Proof: Substituting equations (17), (18) and (19) into the welfare function yields: 
 
                                                 
5 A similar result,  [ ] )) ( 1 ( 5 . 0 ) ( x G b a x W x + + = µ , is obtained when the utility function, 






x U + =  a, b > 0, is used, in which the arguments are the individual’s own income level 














































) ( µ                    ( 2 1 )  
 
Substituting expression (21) into equation (20) completes the proof. 
 
Therefore, the social welfare function is not inequality averse if people feel relative 
satisfaction. We use Result 2 (for a = b = 1) to link overall bipolarization in society to 
welfare.  
In the following proposition, we provide an interpretation of the Wolfson 
bipolarization measure in terms of welfare. 
 
PROPOSITION 2. Let x ∈ ℜ
n
+ +  be an income distribution separated into two groups by 
the median income m, let  ) (x P
W  be the Wolfson bipolarization measure, let 
S W1
 be the 
welfare level of the group below m and let 
D W2
 be the welfare level of the group above 
m. Then, it follows that: 
 
[ ]
S D W W W
m
x P 1 2 2
1
) ( − = .                                                                                          (22)  
   15 
Bipolarization is represented by half the difference between the normalized welfare 
levels (based on the median income) of the richer and poorer income groups when 
income groups are separated by median income. Bipolarization increases when the 
welfare of the richer income group rises or when the welfare of the poorer income group 
falls, and vice versa.  
 
Proof. The additive decomposition of the Gini coefficient based on population 
groups when income groups do not overlap is:
6 
 
∑ + = + =
k
k k k
B W B G r x G x G x G x G π ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (   (23)     
where πk is the proportion of the population in group k, rk  is group k’s share of total 
income and Gk is the Gini coefficient of group k. 


























π                  ( 2 4 )  
 
where  µ1 and G1 are, respectively, the mean income and the within-groups Gini 
coefficient  for group 1, and µ2 and G2 are, respectively, the mean income and the 
within-groups Gini coefficient for group 2.  
Moreover, it follows from equations (7) and (8) that: 
 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Bhattacharya and Mahalanobis (1967), Pyatt (1976), and Lambert and Aronson 
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Since the mean income value, µ, is  2 2 1 1 µ π µ π + , it follows that: 
 




1 1 1 2 1 2 1
2
1 ) ( ) ( ) (
2
) ( G G
m
x P
W µ π µ π µ π µ π π µ π − − − + = .  (27)      
 
Substituting  5 . 0 1 = π  into the above yields: 
 
[] 2 2 1 1 1 2 2
1
) ( G G
m
x P
W µ µ µ µ − − − = .                 (28) 
 
We need only consider Result 1,  ) 1 ( 2 2 2 G W
D − = µ , and Result 2,  ) 1 ( 1 1 1 G W
S + = µ , for  
a = b = 1, to obtain the result in (22). 
 
A result derived from Proposition 2 is stated in the following corollary. 
   17 
COROLLARY 1.
7 Let  ) (x P
W be the Wolfson bipolarization measure and let v(x) be the 
social welfare function. Then, if h = m, it follows that: 
 
) ( ) ( 2 x mP W x v
W D − = . (29)     
 
Proof. Given equations (13) and (22), the proof of this result is straightforward. 
 
Overall social welfare is the richer group’s welfare minus the level of bipolarization 
weighted by the median income value. That is, bipolarization can be interpreted as the 
welfare of the richer group that is sacrificed to compensate for income bipolarization 
between poorer and richer income groups. 
Bipolarization is interpreted as a function of individual welfare levels that depends 
not only on individuals’ own incomes but also on their envy of others in their own 
income groups. In particular, people in the income group above h (=m) envy (feel 
relative deprivation towards) individuals with higher incomes, whereas people in the 
group below m envy (feel relative satisfaction towards) individuals with lower incomes.  
In this context, greater heterogeneity within the group implies greater envy within the 
group and, therefore, less internal unity. In fact, individuals from the same group envy 
one another since they move away from their group’s mean income. At the same time, 
alienation is determined in this context by the difference between µ2 and µ1; that is, the 
income differential between the corresponding groups.  
                                                 
7 Another result derived from Proposition 2 but with a less clear interpretation is that 
) ( ) ( 1 x mP W x v
W S + = . Social welfare is the poorer group’s welfare plus the level of polarization 
weighted by the median income.   18 
A relevant question is whether it is reasonable to assume that individuals from the 
richer group feel deprived and that members from the poorer group feel affluent. People 
envy others in their own income groups. Therefore, richer people may feel deprived in 
comparison to those who have even more income than they do. Similarly, poorer people 
may feel more satisfied than those who have less income than they do. However, 
asymmetrical feelings of envy are counterintuitive. We must assume that mentalities, as 
well as incomes, differ: how individuals think depends on the groups to which they 
belong. Consequently, the Wolfson bipolarization measure implies an unreasonable 
welfare model.  
Given this problem, and given that only the median income value can be used to split 
the income distribution into two groups, we have not attempted to identify a welfare 
model for Wang and Tsui’s (2000) generalization of the Wolfson measure. Instead, we 
focus on the polarization measures of Lasso de la Vega and Urrutia (2006) and Esteban 
and Ray (1994). 
The following proposition generalizes the relationship between bipolarization and 
welfare to the LU polarization index when β = 1. 
 
PROPOSITION  3. Let  ) 1 ; ; ( α x P
LU
h  be the LU polarization measure for two income 
groups separated by h and β = 1, let 
D W1
 be the normalized welfare level of the group 
below h and let 
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+ + − =
α α π π α . (30) 
   19 
where the normalization term is the corresponding level of welfare when there is not 
bipolarization in society. According to the LU polarization index, bipolarization is the 
weighted difference between the normalized welfare levels of richer and poorer income 
groups. However, in this case, throughout the income distribution, individuals have the 
same feelings of envy (deprivation).    
 
Proof. Given equations (5) and (25), we have: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1 2 1 2 1
1
1 1 1 ) , ; ( µ µ π π π β α
β α β α − − + − =
+ G G x P
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h  (31) 
 
that is,  
 
( )( ) ( )( )
β α β α µ µ π µ µ π π β α 1 1
1
1 2 1 1 2 1 1 ) , ; ( G G x P
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h − − − − − =
+ . (32)   
 
We know that  ( ) µ µ π µ π µ π − = − 2 2 1 1 1 so: 
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LU
h − − − − − =
+ + .            (33) 
 
Moreover,  ) ; ; ( β α x P
LU
h = 0 if and only if  µ µ µ = = 2 1 . Therefore, given Result 1, 
) 1 ( 1
0
1 G W − = µ  and  ) 1 ( 2
0
2 G W − = µ  can be interpreted as the welfare levels of the 
corresponding groups when there is no bipolarization in society. Hence, we obtain the 
following: 
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h − − − =
+ + α α π π α . (34)   20 
 
To prove the result, we need only define the normalized welfare levels of groups 1 and 
2 as 
0
1 1 1 W W W
D D − =  and 
0
2 2 2 W W W
D D − =  , respectively.  
 
Note that if h  =  m, then  () [ ]
D D LU











α . Despite their apparent 
similarity, this result and that in (22) differ substantially. 
A result derived from Proposition 3 is stated in the following corollary. 
 
COROLLARY 2. Let  ) ; ; ( β α x P
LU
h  be the LU polarization measure for two income 
groups separated by h and let  ) (x v
 be the normalized social welfare function. Then, if  
β = 1, it follows that: 
 






α π π π
π
α α
α x P W x v
LU
h
D − + =
+ . (35)     
 
where the normalization term in  ) (x v  is the level of social welfare when there is no 
bipolarization in society. 
 
Proof. Equation (13) implies that  2 2 1 1 ) ( W W x v π π + = . Hence, given (30), the result 
is proven. 
 
Again, bipolarization can be interpreted as the welfare of the richer group that is 
sacrificed to compensate for income bipolarization. However, in this case, there are no 
asymmetrical feelings of envy. Moreover, any income, h, including median income, ca   21 
be used to split the income distribution into two groups. In fact, if h  =  m, then 
) 1 , ; ( 2 ) ( 2 α
α x P W x v
LU
m
D − = .  
Furthermore, the results in Proposition 3 and Corollary 2 apply to the ER 
polarization index if β is 0, rather than 1, in equation (33). However, these results for 
the ER measure imply that the simple individual utility function,  i i x x U = ) ( , is used.  
Therefore, in this framework, people only care about their own incomes. 
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n
b
a x x U
1
) ( ) ( , with a > 0, b > 0 for all individuals. In this case, 
individuals care not only about their own incomes but also care about the normalized 
average level of deprivation in society. The nonnegative parameter, β,  represents the 











) ( µ  (see Yitzhaki, 1979, and Hey and 
Lambert, 1980), assuming this utility function yields the welfare function   
( )
β µ ) ( ) ( x bG a x W − = . Consequently, the results in Proposition 3 and Corollary 2 apply 
for all values of β  in the LU polarization index. 
   
 
4  BIPOLARIZATION AND POVERTY 
Let the poverty line, z, be the income level that divides the income distribution in two 
groups. In this case, bipolarization between poor people and others is explicitly based 
on a poverty index. To be specific, the LU, ER and Wolfson polarization measures are 
functions of the normalized poverty deficit index, which belongs to the Foster–Greer–
Thorbecke family of poverty measures (see Foster et al., 1984).    22 
First, recall some concepts. Given the poverty line, z, the proportion of people below 
z, denoted by π1, is the so-called headcount ratio, which is the proportion of people who 
are poor in x. This index only relates to the incidence of poverty. Another widely quoted 
poverty index is the income gap ratio, 
z
x Iz
1 1 ) (
µ
− = , in which µ1 is the mean income of 
the poor in x.
  The income gap ratio measures the intensity of poverty but conveys 











) ( , is the sum of 
income distances to the poverty line for poor people, where xs is the largest poor 



























i  and  0 ≥ γ . This family of 
poverty measures is the normalized poverty deficit index or the product of the 
headcount and income gap ratios,  ) ( / ) ( 1 x I z x D z z π = , when  1 = γ . Hence, the 
normalized poverty deficit index is, by definition, sensitive not only to the incidence of 
poverty but also to its intensity. More sophisticated poverty measures that are also 
sensitive to the distribution of income among the poor are not considered in this paper. 
This is because, since they satisfy the principle of progressive transfers, it is difficult to 
obtain from them a clear-cut relationship between bipolarization and poverty 
measurement because bipolarization measures do not satisfy the principle. Below, we 
present some results on bipolarization and poverty.  
 
PROPOSITION 4. Let  ) , ; ( β α x P
LU
z  be the LU polarization index for two income groups 
separated by the z income value and let  ) ; ( γ x T
FGT
z  be the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke 
family of poverty measures. Then, it follows that: 
   23 
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2 2 1 1 ) 1 ; ( 1 1 ) , ; ( .  (36)        
 
The LU polarization measure is a function of the normalized poverty deficit index and 
the poor’s proportion of total income. 
 
Proof: Consider equations (5) and (25): 
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Typically, the poverty line, z, is at a percentage of mean income. In this case, the 
following corollary might be applied. 
 
COROLLARY 3. Let  ) , ; ( β α x P
LU
z  be the LU polarization index for two income groups,  
let  ) ; ( γ x T
FGT
z   be  the  Foster–Greer–Thorbecke  family  of  poverty  measures  and  let         
z = pµ, where p∈[0,1], be the poverty line. Then, it follows that: 
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If the poverty line, z, is assumed to be 50 percent of µ, equation (39) implies 
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z . Moreover, in this case 
for α = 1 and β = 0 the LU polarization index is simply the normalized poverty deficit 
index plus the poor’s proportion of total income, that is, 
µ




z .  
 
However, if the poverty line is in fact the mean income the following corollaries 
might be applied. 
 
COROLLARY 4. Let  ) , ; ( β α x P
LU
z  be the LU polarization index for two income groups, 
let  ) ; ( γ x T
FGT
z  be the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke family of poverty measures and let z = µ  
be the poverty line. Then, it follows that: 
 
( ) ( ) [ ] ) 1 ; ( 1 1 ) , ; ( 2 2 1 1 x T G G x P
FGT LU
µ
β α β α
µ π π β α − + − = .  (40)      
 
COROLLARY 5. Let  ) 0 , 1 ; (x P
LU
z  be the LU polarization index for two income groups 
and α = 1 and β = 0, let  ) ; ( γ x T
FGT
z  be the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke family of poverty 
measures and let z = µ  be the poverty line. Then, it follows that: 
 
) ( ) 1 ; ( ) 0 , 1 ; ( x G x T x P
B FGT LU
µ µ µ = = .  (41)      
 
The LU polarization measure (ER case) is the normalized poverty deficit index when 
the poverty line that separates the two income groups is at the mean value of income   25 
and when the identification sensitivity parameter, α, is unity. In this case, bipolarization 
and poverty are exactly the same. Furthermore, LU is simply the between-groups Gini 
coefficient when α = 1 and β = 0. Therefore, bipolarization measured by LU (or ER), 
poverty measured by the normalized poverty deficit index and inequality measured by 
the between-groups Gini coefficient are exactly the same. 
To link the Wolfson bipolarization index to poverty measures, we use median 
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Again, bipolarization between poor people and others (measured by the Wolfson 
polarization index) depends explicitly on the normalized poverty deficit index and the 
poor’s proportion of total income.  
 
5  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, we have clarified the similarities and differences between inequality 
and polarization measures. In particular, the polarization measures of Esteban and Ray 
(1994), Wolfson (1994) and Lasso de la Vega and Urrutia (2006) have been related to 
the between-groups and within-groups Gini components in the context of two income 
groups. These relationships may therefore be useful for interpreting empirical results. 
For example, the result in Ravallion and Chen (1997) is easily interpreted by 
considering the relationship between the Wolfson bipolarization index and the between-
groups Gini coefficient.   26 
We also proposed two different models of bipolarization in terms of welfare. In both 
models, polarization measures are interpreted as the difference between the welfare 
levels of richer and poorer income groups. Moreover, we showed that social welfare is 
the richer group’s welfare minus the level of income bipolarization. However, the 
Wolfson polarization measure requires the assumption of an asymmetry that is 
counterintuitive. That is, people with above-median incomes feel deprived relative to 
individuals with higher incomes, whereas people below the median are required to feel 
satisfied relative to lower-income individuals. In contrast, the welfare models for the LU 
and ER polarization measures assume that all people feel deprived relative to 
individuals with higher incomes. Consequently, it seems appropriate to use the LU and 
ER indexes to measure bipolarization, at least from a welfare point of view.  
Finally, does reduced poverty lower social conflict? To answer this question, we 
must relate poverty and bipolarization when income bipolarization is considered a 
reasonable proxy for social conflict. In this context, the polarization measures of 
Wolfson (1994), Esteban and Ray (1994) and Lasso de la Vega and Urrutia (2006) are 
functions of the normalized poverty deficit index. Furthermore, the Esteban and Ray 
(1994) polarization measure and the normalized poverty deficit index are found 
equivalent when the identification sensitivity parameter is unity and when the poverty 
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